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Summary 
This thesis pertains to analyse the public procurement Remedies Directive 
in the light of other EU law. The areas and legal instruments that will be 
presented and compared with the Remedies Directive are the Public 
Procurement Directive, fundamental rights and domestic public law. After 
the introduction section, relevant parts of the Public Procurement Directive, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and different aspects of domestic public 
law will, in that order, be scrutinized and put into relation with the 
Remedies Directive. Subsequently, the findings in the previous sections will 
be analysed in a general analysis section where shortcomings of the 
Remedies Directive are identified and conclusions are made. Lastly, the 
conclusions will be discussed in a final discussion where personal opinions 
and observation are shared and presented. 
 
The findings of this thesis demonstrate that the Remedies Directive is in 
need of legislative reform. This conclusion mainly originates from recent 
case law, the entry into force of the CFR as primary EU law and the fact that 
certain parts of the Remedies Directive have not been reviewed since its 
introduction in 1989. The most severe shortcomings in this regard is the 
potential application discrepancy between the Remedies Directive and the 
Public Procurement Directive emanating out of the judgement in the Falk 
Pharma case. However, the Remedies Directive is mainly well aligned with 
the fundamental rights enshrined in the CFR, whereas it needs some 
changes in order to clarify its interplay with domestic public law and ensure 
consistent judicial protection for all procurement decisions. 
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Sammanfattning 
Syftet med denna uppsats är att utvärdera Rättsmedelsdirektivet inom 
offentlig upphandling i ljuset av annan EU-rätt. De rättsområden och 
rättskällor som har analyserats i förhållande till Rättsmedelsdirektivet är 
Upphandlingsdirektivet, grundläggande rättigheter samt nationell offentlig 
rätt. Efter introduktionen kommer relevanta delar av 
Upphandlingsdirektivet, Europeiska Unionens Rättighetsstadga och olika 
aspekter avseende nationell offentlig rätt att belysas och jämföras med 
Rättsmedelsdirektivet. Vidare har det som framkommit i föregående delar 
av uppsatsen analyserats i ett övergripande analyssegment där 
Rättsmedelsdirektivets tillkortakommanden identifieras. Uppsatsens 
frågeställningar har också besvarats i detta segment. Slutligen har 
slutsatserna diskuterats och personliga åsikter och observationer 
presenterats. 
 
De resonemang som förts och de slutsatser som dragits i denna uppsats visar 
att Rättsmedelsdirektivet är i behov av legislativ revidering. Detta 
konstaterande härrör i första hand från ny praxis från EU-domstolen, att 
Rättighetsstadgan har blivit primärrätt och faktumet att vissa delar av 
Rättsmedelsdirektivet inte har ändrats sedan dess tillkomst 1989. Det mest 
alarmerande tillkortakommandet som har identifierats är den potentiella 
diskrepansen vad avser tillämpningsområde mellan Rättsmedelsdirektivet 
och Upphandlingsdirektivet som är ett resultat av domskälen i Falk 
Pharma-fallet. Hursomhelst är Rättsmedelsdirektivet i stora drag väl 
förenligt med de rättigheter som garanteras i Rättighetsstadgan. Däremot 
kommer det att behövas några förändringar för att klargöra dess samspel 
med nationell offentlig rätt och säkerställa att alla upphandlingsbeslut 
omfattas av samma rättsliga skydd.  
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Abbreviations 
CFR Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union 
 
ECJ/ The Court The European Court of Justice 
 
EU   European Union 
 
OJ Official Journal of the European 
Union 
 
Public Procurement Directive Directive 2014/24/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 February 2014 on 
public procurement and repealing 
Directive 2004/18/EC 
 
Remedies Directive Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 
21 December 1989 on the 
coordination of the laws, 
regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the 
application of review procedures to 
the award of public supply and 
public works  
 
TEU   The Treaty on the European Union 
 
TFEU The Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Legal Context and Background 
 
The aim of EU public procurement law is to create a common market where 
public contracts are awarded by using an anti-discriminatory and transparent 
procedure. Approximately, the total annual value of public procurement 
contracts concerning works, supplies and services amounts to two trillion 
euros.1 The EU public procurement regulatory framework consists of 
directives that pertain to ensure that public funds are used as efficiently as 
possible. Studies have shown that compliance with the EU procurement 
rules results in an overall cost decrease of six billion euros a year.2  
 
In order to safeguard the different interests that a public procurement 
procedure implicates, a directive consisting of procedural provisions and 
remedies was issued in 1989.3 Initially, the Remedies Directive was lacking 
in many regards and it has subsequently been amended several times since it 
appeared in its original form.4 The most substantial amendments were made 
in 2007.5 In general, the intention behind the changes was to implement two 
new remedies and to prevent illegal procurement practices.6 In 2014, a new 
                                                
1 Bovis, Christopher H, EU Public Procurement Law, Second Edition, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 2012, p. 2.  
2 Commission Staff Working Paper, Evaluation Report, Impact and Effectiveness of EU 
Public Procurement Legislation, Part 1, Brussels, 2011, p. 147 
3 Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to 
the award of public supply and public works contracts [1989] OJ L 395/33. 
4 Matei, Emanuela, ’The Remedies Directive in public procurement’ in Research Handbook 
on EU Public Procurement Law, Bovis, Christopher (ed), Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, Cheltenham, 2016, p. 352. 
5 Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2007 Amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving 
the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts [2007] OJ 
L 335/31. 
6 European Commission Final Study Executive Summary, Economic efficiency and legal 
effectiveness of review and remedies procedures for public contracts, MARKT/2013/072/C, 
written by Europe Economics and Milieu, 2015, p.9ff. 
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public procurement directive entailed further necessary amendments to the 
Remedies Directive in order to achieve coherence between the directives.7 
 
As has already been implied, the Remedies Directive pertains to provide 
concrete remedies and a procedural framework for administrating public 
procurement decisions that have been appealed due to an alleged 
infringement of the substantive public procurement rules by a contracting 
authority. The provisions in the Remedies Directive only establish a 
minimum standard for legal review and need to be transposed into national 
law by the EU Member States.8 This inevitably results in procedural 
differences between the domestic laws at the Member State level that 
potentially could cause issues from an internal market perspective. Another 
possible consequence of the quite wide margin of discretion granted by the 
Remedies Directive is conflicts of precedence contra procedural autonomy 
that emanate from incoherence between different levels of public legislation. 
This typically happens when a national administrative provision allegedly 
infringes, or at least affect primary or secondary EU law.  
 
A lot has happened in the legal field of public procurement since the 
Remedies Directive was introduced back in 1989. New kinds of 
procurement contracts have been incorporated and the ECJ has delivered 
many judgements and, thus, affected the public procurement regime through 
adjudication. In addition, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFR) has become primary EU law by the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and, consequently, now has the same legal 
status as the TEU and TFEU.9 This means that the CFR will affect all areas 
where Member States are implementing EU law, including the transposition 
of the directives. CFR provisions that directly provide administrative or 
                                                
7 See Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on the award of concession contracts [2014] OJ L 94/1, Article 46.  
8 Treumer, Steen, ’Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement Rules: The State of 
Law and Current Issues’ in Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement Rules, Volume 3, 
Treumer, Steen; Lichère, François (eds), DJØF Publishing, Copenhagen, 2011, p. 28. 
9 Craig, Paul; de Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials, Sixth Edition, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 394. 
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judicial rights will undeniably be of relevance as far as the Remedies 
Directive is concerned. With all this in mind, it is reasonable to assume that 
some conceivable deficiencies of the Remedies Directive might have been 
overlooked. 
 
In January of 2017, the Commission published a report10 on different 
aspects of the Remedies Directive. The assessment concerned inter alia 
effectiveness and consistency with other EU policies. The Commission 
concluded that the Remedies Directive is general completely aligned with 
primary EU law and general principles concerning fundamental rights. 
Further, the Commission also contended that the Remedies Directive is 
generally coherent with the recent public procurement reforms.11 It was, 
however, deduced that some aspects were in need of clarification, especially 
the interplay with certain contract mechanisms introduced by the 2014 
Public Procurement Directive12 such as decisions of automatic contract 
suspension.13 Lastly, the Commission remarks that the few problems that 
could be identified are rooted in national legislation or practices beyond the 
direct reach of the Remedies Directive.14 The findings of the report can 
hardly be interpreted in any other way than that the Commission does not 
intend to prioritize a regulatory review of the Remedies Directive in the near 
future. 
 
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions 
This thesis pertains to analyse the Remedies Directive through an EU law 
perspective, particularly in the light of relatively recent ECJ case law, 
publications from the Commission and the 2014 substantive public 
                                                
10 Commission Staff Working Document, Evaluation of the Modifications Introduced by 
Directive 2007/66/EC to Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC Concerning the European 
Framework for Remedies in the Area of Public Procurement/REFIT Evaluation, 
COM(2017) 28 final, Brussels, 24.1.2017. 
11 Ibid., p. 55. 
12 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65. 
13 Commission Staff Working Document, COM(2017) 28 final, op.cit., p. 45f. 
14 Ibid., p. 59. 
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procurement reform.  Thus, the research will solely be focused on how well 
the Remedies Directive correlates and interacts with other legal sources, 
both with EU law and domestic Member State legislation. The objective is 
also to discuss concrete solutions in instances where a potential irregularity 
or problem is identified. For the sake of clarity, the research questions of 
this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
 
• Does the Remedies Directive have any regulatory shortcomings in 
the light of the legal interplay with other EU and/or national law and 
if so; how can they be rectified?  
 
It should also be emphasized that the aim of this thesis is not to discredit or 
disprove the conclusions made by the Commission in its report15, but rather 
to conduct an independent and objective analysis. However, the findings of 
the Commission and the conclusions made in this thesis will be compared in 
the discussion segment. 
 
1.3 Delimitations and Methodology 
First of all, this thesis is not intended to be exhaustive in the sense that it 
pertains to highlight all legal aspects where the Remedies Directive might 
be lacking. Overall, the assessment and analysis will focus on the legal 
relationship between the Remedies Directive and three other legal 
instruments and areas. Those are the 2014 Public Procurement Directive, the 
CFR and domestic judicial and administrative legislation that apply to the 
public procurement process at the national level.  
 
Secondly, the Remedies Directive that will be analysed is the one that 
applies to the public sector. The counterpart for the utilities sector16 and its 
                                                
15 Commission Staff Working Document, COM(2017) 28 final, op.cit. 
16 Council Directive 92/13/EEC  of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the 
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and 
telecommunications sectors (OJ L 76, 23.3.1992).  
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corresponding public procurement directive17 do not fall within the ambit of 
this thesis. It should be kept in mind, though, that it is more than likely that 
some arguments, reasoning and conclusions may be somewhat applicable to 
the utilities sector as well, considering the similarities between the different 
public procurement and remedies directives.  
 
The scientific approach and research analysis are characterized by a 
normative legal methodology. Selected doctrine, case law as well as both 
primary and secondary EU law have been presented and accounted for 
whenever deemed to be pertinent. 
 
1.4 Disposition 
In the first section of this thesis, the legal context and background will be 
provided and outlined. Further, the purpose of the thesis is established and 
research questions are formulated. Delimitations are identified and the 
methodology is described. Lastly, the thesis will be put in a broader 
scientific context by accounting for some previous research that has been 
done on the subject. 
 
In the second section of the thesis, the Remedies Directive will be 
introduced. The regulatory structure, the scope of application and the 
different remedies will be accounted for. The third section will go over the 
Public Procurement Directive, highlighting relevant provisions and case 
law. Section four explains the relationship between the Remedies Directive 
and the CFR. In the fifth section, the different levels of administrative 
public procurement law will be scrutinized and put into relation with the 
Remedies Directive. The sixth section will comprise of an extensive 
analysis. Conclusions will be made and the research questions will be 
                                                
17 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal 
services sectors (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014).  
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answered. In the seventh and last section, personal observations and 
opinions will be presented and discussed.   
 
1.5 Previous Research 
There are quite a few publications and articles that partially overlap the 
subject matter of this thesis.18 To my knowledge though, there is not any 
research that specifically and extensively focuses on the Remedies Directive 
in the light of those three general areas that this thesis is limited to. I would 
also argue that recent case law from the ECJ has changed certain conditions 
concerning the legal assessment of the Remedies Directive and its interplay 
with other legislation. In addition, the Commission report19 from earlier this 
year adds another dimension as far as evaluation and comparison go.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 Cf. Simovart, Mari Ann, Old remedies for new violations? The deficit of remedies for 
enforcing public contract modification rules, Upphandlingsrättslig Tidskrift, 2015 nr 1, p. 
33 and Semple, Abby; Andrecka, Marta, Classification, Conflicts of Interest and Change of 
Contractor: A Critical Look at the Public Sector Procurement Directive, European 
Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, 2012, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 171.  
19 Commission Staff Working Document, COM(2017) 28 final, op.cit. 
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2. The Remedies Directive 
2.1 Scope of Application  
According to the first paragraph in its first article, the Remedies Directive 
applies to contracts “referred to in Directive 2014/24/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council”20. Contract, as a legal concept is not 
expressly defined in the Remedies Directive. Instead, the scope of 
application is depending on how “contracts” are defined in the Public 
Procurement Directive. However according to the third paragraph of Article 
1(1), contracts within the meaning of the directive include inter alia 
framework agreements and dynamic purchasing systems. Thus, the 
provisions in the Remedies Directive aim to guarantee a minimum level of 
protection for tenderers participating in the award of contracts falling within 
the scope of the Public Procurement Directive. The fourth paragraph of 
Article 1(1) prescribes that: 
 
“Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that, as 
regards contracts falling within the scope of Directive 2014/24/EU or 
Directive 2014/23/EU, decisions taken by the contracting authorities may 
be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as possible in 
accordance with the conditions set out in Articles 2 to 2f of this Directive, 
on the grounds that such decisions have infringed Union law in the field of 
public procurement or national rules transposing that law.” (Emphasis 
added) 
 
Since the Remedies Directive only stipulates minimum levels of protection 
regarding effective review, the Member States have quite a significant 
margin of discretion while implementing its provisions. Except for the 
mandatory requirements specified in Article 2 to 2f, the Member States are 
free to set up their own administrative and judicial rules for the public 
                                                
20 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65, in this 
thesis referred to as “the Public Procurement Directive”. 
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procurement procedure in the national legislation. Member States have 
different administrative and judicial systems and might, as a result thereof, 
face different legal challenges while implementing EU law. In order to 
ensure an effective implementation and give national legislators the 
possibility to adapt the transposition in accordance with the domestic legal 
system, certain discretion is granted. This discretion is sometimes referred 
to as procedural autonomy.21  
 
2.2 Procedural Provisions 
As regards the availability of remedies, Article 1(3) of the Remedies 
Directive establishes that any person that have or had an interest in 
obtaining a public contract and risks being harmed, or already has been 
harmed, by an alleged infringement shall have access to detailed review 
procedures. According to Article 2(1), Member States must ensure that 
possibilities exist to take interim measures, set aside unlawful decisions and 
to award damages to persons harmed by an infringement.  
 
A contracting authority must wait at least 10 calendar days from the award 
decision until it conclude the contract. This standstill period is regulated in 
Article 2a(2). Its purpose is to ensure that potential aggrieved tenderers will 
have enough time to challenge public procurement decisions. In 
Commission v Spain22, the ECJ ruled that the option of bringing proceeding 
for the annulment of an already concluded contract does not compensate for 
not allowing tenderers to challenge the award decision before the conclusion 
of the contract.23 In another case24, also concerning standstill, the ECJ 
decided that national provisions allowing the contacting authority to 
conclude the contract even though formal aggrieved tenders had formally 
                                                
21 Kristjánsdóttir, Margrét Vala, `Good Administration as a Fundamental Right´ in 
Icelandic Review of Politics & Administration, Vol. 9 No. 1, Institute of Public 
Administration and Politics 2013, p. 245.  
22 Case C-444/06, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain, 
EU:C:2008:190. 
23 Ibid., para. 45. 
24 Case C-327/08, Commission of the European Communities v Republic of the France, 
EU:C:2009:371. 
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submitted claims of appeal were in breach of Article 2a(2) of the Remedies 
Directive.25 The Court also went on to deduce that it, under certain 
circumstances is acceptable to reduce the 10 days delay in case of urgency, 
given that the tenderers still have reasonable time to take legal action.26 
 
Article 2a(2) also prescribes that the communication of the award decision 
shall be accompanied with a summary of relevant reasons. Irish legislation 
that only granted the concerned tenderers basic information, such as the 
name of the successful tenderer, in the first communication following the 
award decision was deemed to be incompatible with the Remedies 
Directive.27 The ECJ argued that such legislation deprived the tenderers of 
the right to effective interim measures.28 In its somewhat earlier case law, 
the ECJ decided that a tenderer has the right to challenge public 
procurement decisions even though the tenderer, mistakenly, had been 
unlawfully invited to the second stage of the procedure.29 The contracting 
authority contended that, since the tenderer should already have been 
excluded had no mistake been made, no harm could be done to the tenderer 
by the exclusion decision in the second stage.30 However, the ECJ 
established that the refusal to allow the tenderer to challenge the decision 
was contrary to the Remedies Directive. The Court explained that the right 
to challenge decisions is extensive and that: 
 
“Article 1(3) … does not permit a tenderer to be refused access to the 
review procedures laid down by the directive to contest the lawfulness of the 
decision of the contracting authority not to consider his bid … on the 
ground that his bid should have been eliminated at the outset …  for other 
reasons and that therefore he neither has been nor risks being harmed by 
the unlawfulness which he alleges. In the review procedure thus open to the 
                                                
25 Ibid., para. 60. 
26 Ibid para. 44 
27 Case C-455/08, Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Ireland, 
EU:C:2009:809. 
28 Ibid., paras. 31-34. 
29 Case C-249/01, Werner Hackermüller v Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft mbH and Wiener  
Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH für den Donauraum AG, EU:C:2003:359. 
30 Ibid., para. 14. 
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tenderer, he must be allowed to challenge the ground of exclusion … he 
alleges to be unlawful.”31 
 
Lastly, as concerns the possibility for Member States to regulate time limits 
for submitting applications challenging a public procurement decision in the 
domestic legislation, the ECJ concluded that the Remedies Directive does 
not preclude such possibilities. The national time limits can, however, not 
be such as to render it virtually impossible or excessively difficult for 
tenderers to challenge decisions taken by the contracting authority.32 It was 
subsequently decided in the Uniplex33 case that it is incumbent on the 
Member States to construe time limits that are sufficiently precise and 
foreseeable in order to fulfil the requirement of rapidity inferred upon them 
by Article 1(1) of the Remedies Directive.34 
 
2.3 Remedies 
The different remedies described in the Remedies Directive can broadly be 
divided into two groups: procedure specific remedies and damages.35 The 
damage compensation is a generic remedy that is available for all aggrieved 
tenderers that have allegedly been harmed by an unlawful public 
procurement decision. The obligation for Member States to ensure that the 
reviewing body of first instance has the power to award damages is 
regulated in Article 2(1)(c).  
 
Procedure specific remedies are not generic in nature. Instead, they always 
relate to the contract at hand. Interim measures, regulated in Article 2(1)(a), 
do not necessarily need to have a suspensive effect on the contract to which 
they relate according to Article 2(4). Such an interim measure can, for 
                                                
31 Ibid., para. 29. 
32 Case 241/06, Lämmerzahl GmbH v Freie Hansestadt Bremen, EU:C:2007:597, paras. 50-
52. 
33 Case C-406/08, Uniplex (UK) Ltd v NHS Business Services Authority, EU:C:2010:45. 
34 Ibid., para. 39. 
35 Treumer op. cit., p. 28f.  
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example be the setting aside of an unlawful decision and retracting the entire 
public procurement procedure to the relevant phase preceding the infringing 
decision. Ineffectiveness is a relatively new remedy that was introduced by 
the amending directive of 2007.36 Member States must ensure that a contract 
is rendered ineffective by a review body in case of the occurrence of any of 
the circumstances listed in Article 2d(1). The consequences of a contract 
being declared ineffective shall be described in national law according to 
Article 2d(2). Member States may provide for national review bodies to 
impose alternative remedies instead of ineffectiveness, after having assessed 
all relevant aspects. These alternative remedies are either the imposition of a 
fine on the contracting authority or shortening the duration of the contract in 
accordance with Article 2(e). It should be noted that there is no given 
hierarchy between the different remedies and that the national legislators are 
granted a wide margin of discretion to regulate the criteria alluding to the 
interim measures.37 
 
In a case38 emanating out of the Netherlands, the ECJ had to assess the 
Dutch review procedure following a claim for interim measures and 
damages from an unsuccessful tenderer. At the time, the Netherlands had 
not implemented the parts of the Remedies Directive into national law, 
taking the view that the law in place already met the requirements of the 
directive. In the judicial system of the Netherlands, damage claims as a 
result of public contracts were treated as a matter of private law. Thus, the 
civil courts had jurisdiction over the claims while an administrative court 
had jurisdiction over the substantive public procurement decision.39 The 
Court decided that the Remedies Directive does not preclude such a system, 
even though the two different courts could theoretically make different 
interpretations of EU law and cause internal divergence.40 The general 
                                                
36 Directive 2007/66/EC op. cit. 
37 Treumer op. cit., p. 30. 
38 Case C-568/08, Combinatie Spijker Infrabouw-De Jonge Konstruktie, Van Spijker 
Infrabouw BV, De Jonge Konstruktie BV v Provincie Drenthe, EU:C:2010:751. 
39 Ibid., paras. 10-11. 
40 Ibid., paras. 74-80. 
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requirements for state liability in relation to individuals were reiterated in 
regards to EU public procurement law.41 
 
In yet another case42, the question arose whether damage compensation in 
the Remedies Directive could be made dependant on a requirement of 
culpability on the part of the contracting authority. The ECJ concluded that 
national rules imposing such a requirement is incompatible with the 
Remedies Directive because the provisions therein is based on a 
presumption of fault due an infringement. Thus, the contracting authority 
cannot escape liability by blaming the infringement on the actions of 
individuals.43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 Ibid., para 92. 
42 Case C-314/09, Stadt Graz v Strabag AG, Teerag-Asdag AG, Bauunternehmung Granit 
GesmbH, EU:C:2010:56. 
43 Ibid., para. 45. 
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3. The Public Procurement 
Directive 
3.1 Scope of Application 
The Public Procurement directive establishes rules on the procedures for 
procurement by contracting authorities with respect to public contracts. In 
order to fall within the ambit of the directive, the total value of the contract 
must exceed the thresholds described in Article 4. The very concept of 
procurement within the meaning of the Public Procurement Directive is 
defined in Article 1(2). It states: 
 
“Procurement within the meaning of this Directive is the acquisition by 
means of a public contract of works, supplies or services by one or more 
contracting authorities from economic operators chosen by those 
contracting authorities, whether or not the works, supplies or services are 
intended for a public purpose.” 
 
According to Article 2(1)(5), public contracts are defined as “contracts for 
pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one or more economic 
operators and one or more contracting authorities and having as their 
object the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of 
services”.  
  
These concepts and definitions were subjected to the scrutiny of the ECJ in 
the somewhat recent and controversial Falk Pharma44 case. The dispute 
leading up to the case consisted of different opinions regarding the concept 
of a public contract. The procurement procedure at hand was as such that the 
contracting authority intended to conclude contracts with all tenders that 
were able to fulfil the requirements in the descriptive procurement 
documents. This procedure, in the view of the contracting authority, did not 
                                                
44 Case C-410/14, Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v DAK-Gesundheit, EU:C:2016:399. 
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pertain to conclude public contracts within the meaning of the Public 
Procurement Directive and did not, as a result, implicate the application of 
substantive EU public procurement law. The only interested tenderer 
disagreed with this assessment and brought proceeding before a German 
administrative court, seeking a declaration that the procedure used by the 
contracting authority indeed was compatible with the public procurement 
law.45 The German court stayed the proceedings and referred a question for 
preliminary question to the ECJ, essentially asking whether concept of 
public contract applied in a procedure where the contracting authority did 
not select one or more exclusive economic operators.46 
 
Historically, the concept of contract has been defined extensively in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of public procurement rules.47 However, in Falk 
Pharma, the Court went on to establish that it is “apparent that the choice of 
a tender and, thus, of a successful tenderer, is intrinsically linked to the 
regulation of public contracts by that directive and, consequently, to the 
concept of ‘public contract’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of that 
directive”.48 It should be noted that the Court made its judgement on the 
basis of the older public procurement directive49 that has subsequently been 
repealed. The definition of public contract did, however, remain unchanged 
by the introduction of the 2014 Public Procurement Directive.50 In addition, 
the ECJ used the Public Procurement Directive analogously while defining 
the concept of procurement even though it could not be applied to the 
circumstances of the case ratione temporis.51  
 
The most controversial extrapolation of ECJ, following its reasoning in the 
Falk Pharma case, concerned the implications of defining public contracts 
                                                
45 Ibid., paras. 16-19. 
46 Ibid., para. 31. 
47 Case C-15/04, Koppensteiner GmbH v Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft mbH, 
EU:C:2005:345, para. 29. 
48 Case C-410/14, Falk Pharma op. cit., para. 38. 
49 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts, OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114.  
50 Cf. Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2004/18/EC and Article 2(1)(5) of Directive 2014/24. 
51 Case C-410/14, Falk Pharma op. cit., paras. 25, 40. 
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by the existence of an exclusive choice. Since this conclusion undoubtedly 
will have effects on the scope of application of the Public Procurement 
Directive and constitute an important basis for discussion later on in this 
thesis, it will be quoted in its entirety. 
 
“Consequently, where a public entity seeks to conclude supply contracts 
with all the economic operators wishing to supply the goods concerned in 
accordance with the conditions specified by that entity, the fact that the 
contracting authority does not designate an economic operator to whom 
contractual exclusivity is to be awarded means that there is no need to 
control, through the detailed rules of Directive 2004/18, the action of that 
contracting authority so as to prevent it from awarding a contract in favour 
of national operators.”52 
 
These lines of reasoning can only be interpreted as narrowing the extensive 
definition of contracts that had previously been applied in the case law. 
Furthermore, it introduces a problematic requirement entailing the making 
of exclusive choices that could possible disrupt the relationship between the 
Public Procurement Directive.  
 
3.2 Central Substantive Provisions 
Beyond the scope of application, there are some additional rules in the 
Public Procurement Directive that are of interest for the sake of analysing 
the interplay with the Remedies Directive. Those provisions will be briefly 
presented in this section. 
 
Contract notices are a central part of a public procurement procedure. 
According to Article 49, contract notices shall be used as a means to call for 
competition in respect of all procedures. The content of the descriptive 
document in the notice is regulated in Annex V part C, including inter alia 
                                                
52 Ibid., para. 37 emphasis added. 
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nature of service or provision of goods, conditions for participating and 
timeframe for delivery. Article 18(1) stipulates general principle of public 
procurement that contracting authorities need to take in consideration in 
their dealings with economic operators. These principles consist of anti-
discrimination, transparency and proportionality. 
 
Framework agreement and dynamic purchasing systems are regulated in 
Article 33 and 34 respectively. The two procurement mechanisms are 
similar in the sense that they both typically include more than one tenderer 
that meet the minimum requirements in the descriptive documents. The 
tenderer or tenderers that are awarded the contract are not selected until a 
later stage of the procedure. The main difference between them is that 
dynamic purchasing systems are open for any tenderer that qualifies during 
the validity of the system whereas framework agreements are exclusive to 
one or more successful tenderers that are subsequently awarded contracts 
during a given time period.53  
 
Rules concerning the exclusion of tenderers can be found in Article 57 of 
the Public Procurement Directive. There are both mandatory and optional 
grounds for exclusion. The mandatory grounds, such as economic 
criminality and the use of child labour, are described in Article 57(1) 
whereas the optional ones, such as bankruptcy and risk of distorting 
competition, are listed in Article 57(4). In the Michaniki54 case, the question 
arose whether the exclusion grounds in the substantive EU public 
procurement law were exhaustive. The ECJ ruled that the list in the 
applicable public procurement directive exhaustively described the objective 
considerations of professional quality that are capable of justifying the 
exclusion of a contractor from participation in a public works contract. 
Member States can, however additional exclusive grounds whose aim is to 
                                                
53 Cf. Article 33(1) and 34(1) of Directive 2014/24. 
54 Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, EU:C:2008:731. 
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safeguard the probity of the procedure as long as such measures are deemed 
to be proportionate.55 
 
A new possibility that was incorporated in the Public Procurement was the 
modification of concluded contracts without the need for a new procedure.56 
The conditions for using this possibility can be found in Article 72. A 
contracting authority also has the option to terminate public contracts, 
depending on the national law, in accordance with what is prescribed in 
Article 73. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
55 Ibid., para. 49. 
56 Simovart op. cit., p. 33. 
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4. Fundamental rights 
4.1 Scope of Application 
Article 51 determines the general scope of application of the fundamental 
rights in the CFR. According to Article 51(1), the charter provisions are 
addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union and to Member States, 
only when they are implementing Union law. In Siragusa57, it was 
established that in order to assess whether the concept of “implementing 
Union law” is fulfilled with regards to national law, the court must examine 
the nature of the legislation and whether it pursues objectives other than 
those covered by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting EU 
law.58 In another case, the ECJ stipulated that the charter provisions could 
not, by themselves, trigger their own application.59 
 
The ECJ confirmed some of its previous case law in the Åkerberg 
Fransson60 case in which it declared that the applicability of fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the EU legal order is warranted in all situations 
governed by Union law, but not outside such situations.61 Subsequently, the 
Court went on to deduce the impossibility of situations covered by EU law 
that does not invoke the applicability of EU fundamental rights.62 In the 
more recent Hernández63 case, a very important and clarifying conclusion 
was made regarding the relationship between the CFR and legal areas where 
the EU has passed legislation. The ECJ declared that: 
                                                
57 Case C-206/13, Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia – Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e 
Ambientali di Palermo, EU:C:2014:126. 
58 Ibid., para. 25. 
59 Case C-265/13, Emiliano Torralbo Marcos v Korota SA and Fondo de Garantía Salarial, 
EU:C:2014:187, para. 30.  
60 Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105. 
61 Ibid., para. 19. 
62 Ibid., para. 21. 
63 Case C-198/13, Víctor Manuel Julian Hernández and others v Reino de España and 
others, EU:C:2014:2055. 
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“The mere fact that a national measure comes within an area in which the 
European Union has powers cannot bring it within the scope of EU law, 
and, therefore, cannot render the Charter applicable.“64 
 
A purely internal situation was considered to exist in the Romeo65 case. The 
Italian authorities submitted a question for preliminary ruling concerning the 
possibility to deviate from fundamental principles, especially the right to 
good administration enshrined in Article 41 CFR, while interpreting 
national law.66 The ECJ answered this question by pointing out that the 
Italian legislator hardly had intended to subject purely internal situations to 
Article 41 CFR. Instead the intent was to invoke the applicability of the 
more specific Italian administrative rules governing the situation at hand.67 
Therefore, the ECJ explained the referred questions inadmissible due to lack 
of relevance.68 
 
However, in two other cases that are similar in the sense that they both 
concerned situations to which no primary or secondary EU law was directly 
applicable, Venturini69 and Enterprise Focused Solutions70, the reasoning of 
the court was somewhat different. It was held that, even though a public 
procurement contract falls outside the scope of the substantive EU public 
procurement rules due to not reaching the relevant threshold, general 
principles such as anti-discrimination and transparency apply.71 Similarly, 
those principles apply when there is a potential cross-border interest that EU 
primary law aims to protect.72 
 
                                                
64 Ibid., para. 36. 
65 Case C-313/12, Giuseppa Romeo v Regione Siciliana, EU:C:2013:718. 
66 Ibid., para. 18. 
67 Ibid., para. 35 
68 Ibid., paras. 41-42.  
69 Joined Cases C-159/12 to C-161/12, Alessandra Venturini and others v ASL Varese and 
others, EU:C:2013:791. 
70 Case C-248/14, SC Enterprise Focused Solutions SRL v Spitalul Județean de Urgență 
Alba Iulia, ECLI:EU:C:2015:228. 
71 Ibid., para. 16.  
72 Cases C-159/12 to C-161/12, Venturini op. cit., para. 25. 
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4.2 The Right to Good Administration 
According to Article 41(1) CFR, every person has the right to have affairs 
handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions 
and bodies of the Union. Article 41(2) states that the right to good 
administration includes the right of every person to be heard, before any 
individual measure, which would affect him or her adversely, is taken. 
Every person also have the right to have access to his or her file, while 
respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and 
business secrecy. Furthermore, the right to good administration imposes an 
obligation for administrative bodies to give reasons for their decisions. 
 
The case law of the ECJ and the principles developed therein have had a 
significant impact on the principles surrounding EU fundament rights in 
general,73 and perhaps Article 41 in particular considering that the right to 
good administration cannot be found in any other international legal 
instrument conferring rights unto private citizens.74  
 
It should be noted that the application of Article 41 is limited to “the 
institutions and bodies of the Union”. Seemingly, the only reasonable 
interpretation of this demarcation is that Article 41 cannot be directly 
applied to administrative and judicial procedures conducted by domestic 
authorities and courts. The ECJ has assessed this issue and pointed out that 
Article 41 is indeed not addressed to the bodies of the Member States, 
although the Court did not elaborate on what effect this has with regards to 
the scope of application of the right to good administration.75 In another 
case,76 the ECJ ruled on the right to be heard before adverse individual 
measures are taken. The Court established that the right to be heard, as 
enshrined in Article 41, is a fundamental principle of EU law of general 
                                                
73 Fortsakis, Theodore, Principles Governing Good Administration in European Public 
Law, Volume 11(2), Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 208. 
74 Kristjánsdóttir op. cit., p. 240. 
75 Case- C-482/10, Teresa Cicala v Regione Siciliana, EU:C:2011:868, para. 28. 
76 Case C-277/11, M. M. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and others, 
EU:C:2012:744. 
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application.77 Yet again, the demarcation was not explained or mentioned. 
However, in the propositional judgement, the Advocate General relied on 
the right to be heard as an established principle of EU law and, thus, 
implicitly rejecting a direct applicability of Article 41.78 
 
4.3 The Right to an Effective Remedy 
The right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial is enshrined in Article 47 
CFR. According to this article, “everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective 
remedy”. Thus, in order for Article 47 to apply, the rights or freedoms that 
have allegedly been violated must be rights or freedoms that are guaranteed 
by applicable EU law.79 The concepts of “rights and freedoms” are to be 
broadly interpreted. For example, the ECJ has indicated that decisions that 
affects the applicant adversely is generally capable of falling with the scope 
of Article 47.80 It should also be added that the right to an effective remedy 
implicates a right to be provided with sufficient information in order to be 
able to prepare an effective defence against sanctions decided by Member 
State authorities.81 
 
In the Orizzonte Salute82 case, the ECJ held that the provisions in the 
Remedies Directive must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the CFR, particularly the right to an effective remedy 
before a court or tribunal, provided for in Article 47.83 The right to an 
                                                
77 Ibid., paras. 82-84. 
78 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 26 April 2012, C-277/11, M.M. op. cit., 
EU:C:2012:253, paras. 32-33. 
79 Case C‑370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, EU:C:2012:756, paras. 178–
179. 
80 Case C‑334/12 RX‑II, Oscar Orlando Arango Jaramillo and other v European Investment 
Bank, EU:C:2013:134, paras. 44-45. 
81 Case C-300/11, ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department, EU:C:2013:363, para. 
65, 
82 Case C-61/14, Orizzonte Salute v Azienda Pubblica di Servizi alla persona San Valentino 
and others, EU:C:2015:655.  
83 Ibid., para. 49. 
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effective remedy also includes the right to be heard. This is something that 
Article 47 has in common with Article 41(2).84 
 
The ECJ determined in Fastweb85 that the Remedies Directive is designed to 
strengthen already existing arrangements for ensuring the effective 
application of the EU rules on the award of public contracts.86 
Consequently, the Court could not find any conflict between the Remedies 
Directive and the right to an effective remedy.87 Conversely, as regards the 
interplay between the right to an effective remedy and the Remedies 
Directive, it can be added that the Commission has noted that the Remedies 
Directive is fully in line with the objective of Article 47 CFR.88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
84 Case C-166/13, Sophie Mukarubega v Préfet de police, EU:C:2014:2336, para. 43. 
85 Case C-19/13, Ministero dell’Interno v Fastweb SpA, EU:C:2014:2194. 
86 Ibid., para. 59. 
87 Ibid., paras. 55-65. 
88 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness 
of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts, Brussels, 4.5.2006, 
COM(2006) 195 final, p. 3. 
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5. Domestic Public Law 
5.1 Introduction 
The administrative systems vary between the Member States. Each country 
tends to develop its own practises and precedence in case law regarding how 
administrative decisions are taken and how the judicial review of these 
decisions is to be conducted. In addition, the principle of procedural 
autonomy gives the Member State a certain degree of discretion while 
implementing EU law.89 This discretion enables the possibility to coordinate 
EU legislation with pre-existing national legislation. It should be kept in 
mind, though, that the Member States have a general obligation to remove 
any obstacles in the domestic law that can endanger the effectiveness of 
Union law according to Article 4(3) TEU. National courts consequently 
have, provided that it is possible, to interpret existing national legislation in 
conformity with obligations that the Union imposes on its Member States 
through primary or secondary EU law. This general obligation is sometimes 
referred to as the principle of sincere cooperation.90 
 
Considering that EU public procurement law constitutes an extensive 
regulatory framework that significantly limits the capacities of the Member 
State authorities to act as public purchasers, the domestic courts have to 
ignore incompatible national administrative or judicial legislation.91 In cases 
where domestic public law affects public procurement procedures governed 
by EU law without being directly incompatible, the courts shall make an 
interpretation that is compliant with the aims of the substantive EU rules.92 
This can sometimes be complicated since public procurement law often has 
to exist within a larger administrative framework characterized by national 
regulatory tradition and established legal practises. These difficulties can 
                                                
89 Kristjánsdóttir op. cit., p. 245. 
90 Graells, Albert Sanchez, Assessing Public Administration’s Intention in EU Economic 
Law: Chasing Ghosts or Dressing Windows?, in K A Armstrong (ed), Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies, Cambridge 2016, p. 13. 
91 Ibid., p. 3. 
92 Ibid., p. 17. 
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seldom be solved by applying principles of EU supremacy because the 
problems do not derive from a direct conflict, but rather from juxtaposition 
between different layers of public law. As concerns the Remedies Directive, 
this can result in inconsistency of judicial protection. Below, two cases 
where the ECJ was confronted with this kind of issue will be presented. 
 
5.2 Case Law  
In Pizzo,93 the ECJ had to assess whether a general administrative Italian 
provision, prescribing an obligation to pay mandatory fees in order to 
participate in the public procurement procedure at hand in the case. 
Complicating thing further, the mandatory fees were not expressly 
mentioned in the law. Instead, the obligation to pay such fees was derived 
from established case law by the Italian administrative law.94 As a result of 
having failed to pay the fees in time, a tenderer was excluded from the 
procedure. The question referred to the Court for preliminary ruling 
concerned the issue whether the imposition of such obligations was 
compatible with the substantive EU public procurement law. In this context, 
it is also relevant to point of that the requirement to pay the fees was not 
expressly described in the procurement document.95  
 
The ECJ subsequently explained that the principles of transparency and 
equal treatment, which permeate all public procurement procedures, entail 
that the substantive and procedural premises concerning the participating of 
the procedure must be clearly defined in advance.96  The Court also pointed 
out a potential anti-competitive risk by allowing requirements that arise 
from the interpretation of national law and the practise of domestic 
authorities to have an exclusive effect on tenderers without being detailed in 
the procurement descriptive documents. This would have a particularly 
disadvantageous effect on tenderers established in other Member States 
                                                
93 Case C-27/15, Pippo Pizzo v CRGT Srl, EU:C:2016:404. 
94 Ibid., para. 17. 
95 Ibid., para. 20.  
96 Ibid., para. 37. 
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since they probably do not have the same amount of knowledge about the 
relevant law as domestic tenders, the Court reasoned.97 Thus, the ECJ 
concluded that the exclusion of the tenderer was contrary to the principles of 
EU public procurement law, ruling that “the principle of equal treatment 
and the obligation of transparency must be interpreted as precluding an 
economic operator from being excluded from a procedure for the award of 
a public contract as a result of that economic operator’s non-compliance 
with an obligation which does not expressly arise from the documents 
relating to that procedure or out of the national law in force, but from an 
interpretation of that law”.98 
 
In the recent Taxi Service99 case, the ECJ had to assess whether a decision 
not to exclude a tenderer was contrary to EU public procurement law. The 
situation was, in that regard, opposite compared to the circumstances in 
Pizzo. The dispute in the main proceedings was a consequence of a Dutch 
contracting authority choosing not to exclude a successful tenderer who was 
guilty of grave professional misconduct, even though that tenderer definitely 
should have been excluded according to the descriptive documents. This 
decision was based on a general rule in the Dutch administrative public law, 
stating that an assessment in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality must be conducted before a tenderer is, indeed, excluded 
from the public procurement procedure. The contracting authority found that 
it would be disproportionate to exclude the tenderer, a decision that was 
appealed by the tenderer in second place.100 The Dutch court stayed the 
proceedings and asked the ECJ whether the fact that the descriptive 
documents clearly prescribed that a tenderer who has been guilty of grave 
professional conduct must be excluded, was significant in the sense that it 
precludes the contracting authority from conducting a proportionality 
assessment before potentially excluding the tenderer.101 
                                                
97 Ibid., para. 46. 
98 Ibid., para. 51, emphasis added. 
99 Case 171/15, Connexxion Taxi Services BV v Staat der Nederlanden and others, 
EU:C:2016:948. 
100 Ibid., paras. 13-23. 
101 Ibid., para. 26. 
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Yet again, the ECJ identified an anti-competitive aspect of allowing 
domestic administrative rules to take precedence over the conditions that are 
determined and detailed in the descriptive document. Since domestic 
tenderers probably are aware of the general administrative rule entailing that 
authorities have to conduct a proportionality test pre-exclusion, they might 
be tempted to submit a tender and try to partake in the procedure despite the 
fact that they are guilty of an exclusion ground that must lead to exclusion 
according to the descriptive documents. Tenderers established in other 
Member States will, under the same circumstances, most likely refrain from 
participating assuming that they will be excluded regardless of the merits of 
their offer.102 The Court ultimately contended that the decision not to 
exclude was incompatible with the principles of EU public procurement 
law. The ECJ concluded that, according to the obligation of transparency, it 
is precluded “to award a public contract to a tenderer which has been guilty 
of grave professional misconduct on the ground that the exclusion of that 
tenderer from the award procedure would be contrary to the principle of 
proportionality, [when], according to the tender conditions of that contract, 
a tenderer which has been guilty of grave professional misconduct must 
necessarily be excluded, without consideration of the proportionality of that 
sanction”.103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
102 Ibid., 41-42. 
103 Ibid., para. 44, emphasis added. 
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6. Analysis and Conclusions 
6.1 The Public Procurement Directive 
The potential application discrepancy between the Remedies Directive and 
the Public Procurement Directive is mainly stemming out of the judgement 
in the Falk Pharma case and the definition of contract and public 
procurement in the light of Article 1(1) of the Remedies Directive and 
Article 1(2) of the Public Procurement Directive. Since the Remedies 
Directive only applies to contracts referred to in the Public Procurement 
Directive, it can be concluded that a contract falling outside the definition of 
“public contract” within the meaning of the Public Procurement Directive is 
excluded from review in the light of the Remedies Directive. This 
conclusion constitutes a fundamental premise in the following analysis. 
 
In Falk Pharma, the ECJ established that it is “apparent that the choice of a 
tender and, thus, of a successful tenderer, is intrinsically linked to the 
regulation of public contracts by that directive and, consequently, to the 
concept of ‘public contract’”.104 The Court subsequently went on to 
stipulate that a procurement scheme, such as the one at hand in the case, 
where the contracting authority intended to enter into agreement with all 
tenderers can deliver in accordance with the predetermined conditions, did 
not constitute a public contract within the meaning of the Public 
Procurement Directive. The absence of an exclusive choice by the 
contracting authority was crucial in the reasoning of the ECJ and, thus, for 
the outcome of the case. 
 
The Falk Pharma case raises many questions concerning the interplay 
between the Remedies Directive and the Public Procurement Directive with 
regards to applicability. The ECJ effectively narrowed the definition of 
public contracts and consequently of public procurement as a legal concept. 
By using the same logic and reasoning as the Court did in Falk Pharma, 
                                                
104 See section 3.1. 
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public procurement decisions made by contracting authorities that do not 
consist of, or is intended to lead up to, an exclusive choice of a tenderer are 
exempt from reviewability in accordance with the Remedies Directive. 
 
The exclusivity requirement established by the ECJ results in uncertain 
scope of application of the Remedies Directive with regards to some public 
procurement decisions. For example decisions concerning the setting up of 
framework agreements with more than one supplier where the contracting 
authority does not, at least initially, choose an exclusive tenderer. This 
disparity is extra unfortunate due to the fact that framework agreements are 
expressly mentioned in the first article of the Remedies Directive. By using 
the same logic as the Court did in Falk Pharma, the decision to set up a 
framework agreement would be excluded from review because of lack of an 
exclusive choice of a tenderer. This would, for the same reason, also apply 
to dynamic purchasing systems. Inevitably, this constitutes a potential legal 
discrepancy between the Remedies Directive and the substantive public 
procurement law whose effectiveness it aims to ensure.  
 
Similarly, the Falk Pharma case also creates complications concerning the 
recently introduced possibility for contracting authorities to modify 
contracts during their term without starting a new public procurement 
procedure. The decision to award the initial contract has already been 
subjected to review in accordance with the provisions in the Remedies 
Directive. When the contracting authority subsequently modifies the 
contract, no new exclusive choice is made. Then, by applying the reasoning 
in the Falk Pharma case and the exclusive choice criteria stipulated therein, 
the decision to change the content of the procurement agreement would not 
constitute an establishment of a public contract. This will in turn result in 
the modification decision falling outside the scope of the Remedies 
Directive. The logic that permeates these lines of reasoning is based on the 
premise that the modified contract is completely separate from the original 
public procurement procedure. 
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Analogous arguments can be adduced with regards to decisions to terminate 
an existing contract. The conditions for discretionary termination are clearly 
listed in Article 73 of the Public Procurement Directive. Just as in the case 
of modification, the exclusive choice has already been made and the 
procedure leading up to it has already been subjected to review within the 
ambit of the Remedies Directive. A decision entailing the termination of an 
existing contract does not comprise a new exclusive choice. Thus, it can 
reasonably be argued that it falls outside the scope of the Remedies 
Directive using the principles developed through the Falk Pharma case. 
 
The central idea appears to be that the very concept of public procurement is 
intrinsically and inherently linked with making exclusive choices. If no such 
choice is made, there is no need to subject public procurement decisions to 
review. This makes sense from a strict public procurement perspective, 
especially from the view of the tenderers, since the equity of the procedure 
cannot really be questioned until the contracting authority chooses a tender 
while rejecting others. However, it fails to take any other aspects into 
account.  
 
In summary, it can be concluded that there are some uncertainties regarding 
the applicability of the Remedies Directive concerning some public 
procurement decisions. The definitions of public contract and public 
procurement that were introduced by the Public Procurement Directive are 
the root to the discrepancy. These issues will remain until the ECJ changes 
its precedence or legislative actions are taken. 
 
6.2 Fundamental Rights 
The entry into force of the CFR as primary EU law has created some 
questions of constitutional nature regarding the Remedies Directive and its 
interplay with fundamental rights. Overall, there are mainly two rights in the 
CFR that are relevant for the provisions in the Remedies Directive; namely 
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the right to good administration and the right to an effective remedy, 
enshrined in Article 41 and 47 respectively.  
 
In summary, two different questions arise from the relationship between the 
Remedies Directive and the CFR. The first question concerns compatibility 
and the second involves possible implications of a general CFR application 
to public procurement review at the Member State level. One of these 
questions is considerably more complicated than the other.  
 
As far as complicity goes, there are no conflicts between the Remedies 
Directive and the CFR. On the contrary, the provisions of the Directive are 
well aligned with the fundamental rights and principles in the CFR. It was 
deduced by the ECJ in the Orizzonte Salute case that the provisions in the 
Remedies Directive must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental 
rights in the Charter, especially the right to an effective remedy in case of an 
alleged violation of EU law. A similar ruling was made in Fastweb, where 
the Court decided that no conflict could be found between the Remedies 
Directive and the fundamental right to an effective remedy. In addition, the 
Commission declared in its proposal that preceded the 2007 amendments of 
the Remedies Directive that the intended changes were fully in line with 
Article 47 CFR and general principles such as transparency and 
proportionality.105 
 
There are some issues concerning scope of application surrounding the 
wording and interpretation of Article 41 CFR. However, the ECJ has 
established that the right to good administration constitutes a general 
principle of EU law. For the sake of this thesis, it suffices to conclude that 
the different rights that can be derived from the concept of good 
administration create legal standards for the Remedies Directive whether or 
not Article 41 CFR is applicable to judicial review conducted by Member 
State authorities and courts. Moreover, in the case of EU public 
procurement law, there is seemingly no meaningful distinction to be made 
                                                
105 See section 4.3. 
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between good administration as enshrined in the CFR and good 
administration as a general principle of EU law developed by the ECJ 
through case law, even though it is unclear whether the general principle has 
identical implications compared to Article 41. Since Article 41 CFR can be 
regarded as a codification of said general principle, it will hereunder be 
referenced when the right to good administration is discussed, even though 
it seems clear that its semantic demarcation precludes a direct application to 
judicial and administrative review at the Member State level.  
 
The rights that are encompassed by the CFR apply to the Member States 
whenever they are implementing Union law. This is apparent from the 
wording of Article 51(1) CFR. In Siragusa, the ECJ established that, when 
domestic rules are concerned, it has to inter alia be ascertained whether that 
legislation is intended to implement a provision of EU law or if there are 
specific rules of EU law on the matter capable of affecting it. As far as 
domestic legislation transposing EU public procurement rules are 
concerned, the rights in the CFR are structurally implicated because the 
purpose of the transposition is to create a harmonized public procurement 
system. Thus, all requirements derived from Article 51(1), clarified by 
subsequent case law, are fulfilled when Member States are implementing 
provisions in the Remedies Directive. It can thereby be deduced that the 
rights in the CFR apply to such Member State rules, regardless of whether 
they are judicial or administrative in nature. 
 
A specific issue of application arises in relation to domestic rules that are 
internal in the sense that they are not designed to transpose EU law. It could 
reasonably be assumed that national public procurement legislation that falls 
outside the scope of the substantive EU public procurement law would not 
typically infer CFR applicability. Case law, like the Romeo case, appears to 
support such an assumption. The ECJ argued that since the national 
legislator did not appear to have intended purely internal situations to be 
subjected to Article 41 of the CFR, the right to good administration could 
not have an impact on the domestic administrative rules in that regard. This 
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line of reasoning makes sense considering the general limitations to CFR 
application enshrined in Article 51and the conclusions made in recent case 
law, such as the Hernández case.  
 
There are a few cases that point in a different direction, such as Venturini 
and Enterprise Focused Solutions. A purely internal situation can arguably 
never exist in public procurement situations that invoke a risk for affecting 
cross-border interests. Such situations generally falls within the ambit of 
fundamental rights derived from primary EU law since adherent effect on 
cross-border activity is generally incompatible with the TEU and 
undesirable from an EU perspective. However, there is nothing in the case 
law that suggests an overall application of the CFR public procurement 
procedures that fall outside the scope of the Remedies Directive, even 
though some provisions in the TEU and the general principle of anti-
discrimination always apply. Thus, it appears reasonable to assume that 
CFR application is directly dependant on the Remedies Directive being 
applicable. The application of the two legal instruments overlaps. 
 
Lastly, it can be concluded that the CFR is structurally concerned in public 
procurement review when the Remedies Directive is applicable. Moreover, 
the Remedies Directive is already well aligned with the relevant provisions 
in the CFR. A clarification regarding the details around the application of 
the right to good administration in Article 41 CFR and its interplay with the 
Remedies Directive would be preferable though.  
 
6.3 Domestic Public Law 
Just like all other EU directives, the Remedies Directive has to be 
transposed into domestic legislation in the Member States. Public 
procurement law oftentimes has to coexist with general, domestic 
administrative and judicial rules. The reason behind this relationship is that 
the transposed public procurement legislation seldom is totally separate 
from other types of public law at the Member State level. Thus, it has to find 
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its place within a larger administrative framework and interact with other 
kinds of rules and practises. The main issue at hand, as concerns the 
Remedies Directive and the EU substantive public procurement rules whose 
effectiveness it aims to safeguard, is not really that of conflicting provisions 
but rather of ensuring the same degree of judicial protection and legal 
certainty regardless of which layer of public law that is applied. In order to 
analyse this in detail, a distinction needs to be made between domestic 
public procurement rules that directly implements EU law, domestic public 
procurement rules that exist independently of EU law and domestic 
administrative or judicial rules or practises that are not public procurement 
law per se but somehow affect or has the potential to affect public 
procurement procedures. 
 
According to the fourth paragraph of Article 1(1) of the Remedies Directive, 
“Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that . . . 
decisions taken by the contracting authorities may be reviewed effectively . . 
. on the grounds that such decisions have infringed Union law in the field of 
public procurement or national rules transposing that law.106 The phrasing 
of this provision gives rise to quite a few issues. In the case of domestic 
rules directly implementing EU law, there is not really that much to 
mention. A claim based on such rules will always be claims consisting of 
infringement of Union law or national rules transposing that law. In the case 
of rules that are not transposing EU law, it becomes more complicated. 
 
The most logical interpretation of Article 1(1) is that claims that are being 
submitted for review need to be founded on non-compliance or breach of 
EU law, or national rules transposing such law, in order for the obligation of 
ensuring effective review to apply along with other rights that the Remedies 
Directive provides. Consequently, if a claim of a tenderer solely is based on 
the allegedly incorrect interpretation or application of a domestic rule, that is 
not aimed to transpose EU law, other procedural and judicial rules than 
those in Articles 2-2f of the Remedies Directive could be applied for the 
                                                
106 See section 2.1. 
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review of that claim. Then, theoretically this would mean that different 
review systems could be used at the Member State level depending on 
which rules the claimant decides to base the claim on and more importantly 
on which basis the claimant chooses to enunciate the legal arguments. The 
main difference between domestic public procurement rules and domestic 
administrative rules ought to be that it typically will be more difficult to 
claim infringement in the light of Article 1(1) when the latter set of rules are 
applied. In addition, the more general administrative rules are probably 
more obscure in the eyes of the tenderers and harder to overview pre-
contentiously. Needless to say, this will vary from case to case.  
 
A very peculiar legal situation will arise if domestic public law that is 
obviously completely compatible with EU law affects a public procurement 
procedure concerning a contract covered by the Public Procurement 
Directive and, thus, the Remedies Directive. Even though the Remedies 
Directive in a situation like this will apply per se, the wording of the fourth 
paragraph of Article 1(1) will preclude the application of its most important 
provisions, namely those stipulating how the review should be conducted. It 
should be added that the claimant probably could invoke full applicability of 
the Remedies Directive by simply claiming infringement, however 
unfounded such a claim might be. 
 
In both the Pizzo case and the Taxi Service case, questions were raised 
concerning the relationship between the Remedies Directive, substantive EU 
public procurement law and domestic public law as regards the exclusion of 
tenderers. The reasoning of the ECJ in these two cases is strikingly similar. 
The Court emphasized on the fact that the content of the domestic law was 
not included in the tender conditions in the descriptive public procurement 
document. In Pizzo, it was established that it would be contrary to the 
principles of transparency and anti-discrimination to let the interpretation of 
national legislation notably change the initial tender conditions that are 
expressly detailed in the procurement contract since this would be 
particularly disadvantageous to tenderers established in other Member 
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States. Such tenderers would likely not be as familiar with national law and 
administrative practise as domestic tenderers. Similarly, in Taxi Services, 
the ECJ explained that a contracting authority is precluded to apply the 
principle of proportionality to the exclusion of a tenderer, even though this 
possibility exists according to the national public procurement law, if a 
tenderer must be excluded according to the tender conditions. 
 
The outcomes in the two cases are practical from a legal certainty 
perspective in the sense that it gives the conditions in the tender conditions 
in the descriptive document precedence over the established interpretation 
of domestic administrative law. It does, however, give rise to more complex 
issues such as subsidiarity and national procedural autonomy. A strict 
application of the reasoning of the Court would implicate an obligation for 
the contracting authority to include all relevant national legislation as well 
as its associated interpretation and case law in order to ensure the 
application of these rules to the public procurement procedure. 
 
Overall, it can be concluded that the relationship with domestic public law 
could use a clarification. Article 1(1) of the Remedies Directive creates 
uncertainties in some instances concerning which substantive rules that 
should be applied to public procurement decisions based on domestic public 
law. The ECJ also appears to have bypassed some of these legal issues by 
potentially overrating the importance of the tender conditions in relation to 
national rules. 
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7. Discussion 
7.1 The Public Procurement Directive 
The application uncertainties between the Remedies Directive and the 
Public Procurement Directive primarily derive from the controversial 
judgement in the Falk Pharma case. A mistake that I think the ECJ made in 
its reasoning is that it relied too much on the strict definition of 
procurement, while failing to see the bigger picture. This mistake will 
likely, as has been previously argued in this thesis, result in a significant 
number of different public procurement decisions falling outside the scope 
of the Public Procurement Directive, and consequently the Remedies 
Directive. A conclusion entailing that, inter alia, decisions to set of dynamic 
purchasing systems or modifications of contracts do not need to be 
subjected to administrative review was hardly the intent of the legislator. In 
my opinion, there is an obvious absurdity in that the very definition of 
public procurement can exclude some public procurement decisions, which 
are described and specified in the Public Procurement Directive, from 
administrative reviewability.  
 
It can also be argued that the Court failed to take other important aspects 
into account. For example, one of the overriding purposes of EU public 
procurement legislation is to facilitate cross-border competition by 
removing obstacles that are discriminatory in nature. By separating some 
public procurement decisions from the concept of public contract, the ECJ 
opened up for risks of increased protectionism since it is possible that the 
procedure contains award criteria that favours domestic tenderers, even 
though the procedure per se is open for everyone and the contracting 
authority intends to conclude contracts with all tenderers fulfilling the 
minimum requirements in the descriptive documents. An aggrieved tenderer 
that is being falling victim for indirect discrimination in a procurement 
procedure, such as the one in Falk Pharma, will be deprived of the 
protection granted by the substantive rules in the Public Procurement 
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Directive as well as the access to review within the ambit of the Remedies 
Directive. This fact alone might deter tenderers from participating in such 
procurement procedures. Undoubtedly, this will have anti-competition 
effects that I think the ECJ as least should have addressed in its legal 
reasoning. 
 
Lastly, I can only hope that the judgement in Falk Pharma, will be 
overruled and replaced with precedence implicating a more lenient attitude 
towards the wording of Article 1(2) of the Public Procurement Directive and 
the definition of public contract. Alternatively, a reform of the concept of 
public procurement could be made in order to fix the issues detailed above. 
Such a reform should preferably amount to focus on the concept of choosing 
and, instead, put emphasis on acquisition alone. 
 
7.2 Fundamental Rights 
As a general point of discussion, it should be noted that Article 41 and 47 in 
the CFR overlap. The right to good administration and the right to an 
effective remedy have quite a few things in common. An example of this 
overlap is the right to be heard which is considered to be an essential part of 
a fair trial. As we have seen, this right is more detailed in Article 41 but is 
nonetheless within the scope of Article 47. The close connection between 
the procedural administration and judicial effectiveness and fairness cannot 
be ignored. Since both rights apply to the Remedies Directive, the overlap 
will not have an impact on the relationship between the Remedies Directive 
and the CFR.  
 
An interesting question is how to balance the right to good administration 
with the rapid administrability and effectiveness of the review procedure. 
Essentially, the question also alludes to finding a balance between the 
interests of the contracting authority and the tenders respectively, speed and 
practicality contra legal certainty and procedural rights. The right to be 
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heard before any adverse measure is taken can entail considerable delay, 
especially since the contracting authority needs to give the tenderer 
sufficient time to submit its point of view and meticulously motivate its 
response to every appeal. It could be argued that, since the CFR is primary 
EU law, that it is redundant to address its implication in the Remedies 
Directive. However, it is very important to explain how the general 
provisions in the CFR concretely interact with other procedural rules.    
Therefore, I think it would be extremely preferable to include a detailed 
clarification in the Remedies Directive regarding what procedural 
obligations contracting authorities and domestic courts have in view of the 
right to good administration. For example, the right to access the file is not 
even mentioned in the Remedies Directive as of now. 
 
Another interesting question is how extensive and intense the judicial 
review needs to be in order to be fully compatible with the right to an 
effective remedy and a fair trial enshrined in Article 47 CFR. In a public 
procurement procedure, there a several kinds of decisions or assessments 
made by the contracting authority that an aggrieved tenderer might want to 
appeal. Obviously, most decisions are made on the basis of national public 
procurement legislation transposing EU law or other domestic public law. 
Appealing such decisions to a court of first instance for judicial review 
should, typically, not be problematic since they can be derived form specific 
circumstances or facts surrounding the procedure at hand and how this, 
according to the contracting authority relates to the descriptive procurement 
document and the applicable law.  
 
However, it becomes more difficult when there are disagreements regarding 
the substantive meaning of award criteria that involves elements of arbitrary 
assessment. Overall, discretion exerted by contracting authorities in the 
selection of tenders is generally undesirable considering that the descriptive 
documents should be sufficiently precise in order for all parties to predict 
how different factors and merits will be evaluated. A certain degree of 
discretion is probably impossible to avoid though. The question, then, is 
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how a court is to assess appeals where aggrieved tenderers are of another 
opinion than the contracting authority concerning relative parameters. In my 
view, these kinds of issues will always and inevitably arise due to different 
interpretations of the descriptive documents in the contract notice, especially 
in more complex procurement procedure where both the relative merits and 
the award criteria are more complicated to overview. There is undoubtedly 
nothing that indicates that the probity of the procedure will be improved by 
replacing the discretion of a contracting authority with the arbitrariness of a 
court. In this context, it should also be pointed out that the authority 
probably is better suited to assess relative merits since it has a close 
connection to the practical purpose that the merits aims to fulfil. Therefore, 
it is probably not a good idea for the court of first instance to second-guess 
the assessment of authorities in this regard, provided that it is compatible 
with the applicable law. The judicial public procurement review imposed on 
the Member States by the Remedies Directive and Article 47 CFR does not, 
in my opinion, go beyond assessing the legality of the decisions and 
providing sufficient reasons for the assessment. 
 
The exclusion of tenderers entails additional problems with regards to the 
intensity of the judicial review and the right to good administration. 
Considering that the mandatory and optional exclusion grounds might be 
very different in nature, varying from criminal behaviour to the potential 
distortion of competition, it is reasonable to assume that different standards 
of judicial protection should apply. Exclusion decisions can be dependant on 
other legislation and its interpretation such as criminal law, insolvency law 
and competition law. Typically, different requirements regarding burden of 
proof and evidentiary evaluation are applied in these different areas of law. I 
think that this somehow should be reflected in the Remedies Directive. For 
example, requiring further obligations to provide reasons when a contracting 
authority intends to exclude a tenderer due to alleged involvement in 
criminal activity could achieve this aim.  
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7.3 Domestic Public Law 
It has previously in this thesis been argued that the phrasing of the fourth 
paragraph of Article 1(1) opens up for some interpretations with peculiar 
results.107 This argumentation is based on the fact that the concept of having 
infringed indicates that an aggrieved tenderer somehow must form the 
appeal as a claim of non-compliance or incompatibility with EU public 
procurement law in order for the procedural provisions of the Remedies 
Directive to apply, alongside the judicial protection that they entail. If this 
assumption is true, then it is possible for Member States to instate different 
judicial procedures depending on how the appellant phrases the legal 
argumentation, even though it would assumedly be administratively 
impractical to do so. The judicial protection could potentially depend on 
whether the aggrieved tenderer claims non-compliance with EU law or only 
an incorrect application of purely domestic public law. This was most likely 
not an intended result. The legislator might have overlooked the possibility 
of domestic public law being able to affect the public procurement 
procedure without, for that sake, infringing on EU law or national law 
transposing such law. Reasonably, this can potentially have anti-competitive 
effects if it deters foreign tenderers from participating in public procurement 
procedures because they are uncertain of which rights they have in the case 
of a legal conflict with the contracting authority.  
 
Personally, I do not see the point of including such a limitation to the 
applicability of the procedural provisions in the Remedies Directive. Simply 
by skipping the part that starts with “on the grounds that such decisions 
have infringed” could solve the problems mentioned above.  
 
The ECJ might have found its own solution to these issues of applicability 
and judicial protection though. Considering the judgements in Pizzo and 
Taxi Services, domestic administrative rules and practises must be described 
in the contract conditions in order for the contracting authority and the 
                                                
107 See section 6.3. 
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tenderers to be able to rely on such law or practises. The reasoning used by 
the ECJ in these two cases effectively renders domestic public law useless 
with regards to public procurement. If the domestic public law is in conflict 
with EU law, it cannot apply for obvious reasons. If it is in conflict with EU 
law and included in the descriptive procurement documents, it cannot apply 
for the same obvious reasons. Lastly if it is compatible with EU law but not 
included in the descriptive document, it cannot be applied since this would 
infringe on the obligation of transparency. It can only have meaning if it is 
compatible and included in the descriptive document. From this, I deduce 
that the ECJ has deprived domestic public law of its legal independence by 
strictly giving precedence to the contract conditions.  
  
I have to admit that the reasoning of the Court makes perfect sense from a 
pure EU public procurement perspective. By giving such a great importance 
to the descriptive documents, the ECJ has managed to ensure equal judicial 
protection for claims based on purely domestic law since such a claim 
would be futile unless it has support in the contract conditions. However, 
the conclusions by the ECJ raise difficult concerns about the balance 
between conformity and subsidiarity as well as between Union consistency 
and Member State sovereignty. These questions fall outside the scope of this 
thesis though. 
 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
I believe that this thesis has demonstrated that there are shortcomings in the 
Remedies Directive that are in need of legislative reform or general 
clarifications. In view of these deductions, I think it is extremely 
disappointing that the Commission,108 despite having identified some 
shortcomings on its own, seems generally uninterested in initiating any 
actions leading to a legal overview of the provisions in the Remedies 
Directive. Most likely, it lies in the nature of the Commission to assume a 
                                                
108 See section 1.1. 
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pragmatic attitude rather than indulging in theoretical reasoning. 
Nevertheless, I hope that the Commission will reconsider its priorities 
sometime in the near future. 
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